September 29, 2006 : The CADwire

Bloomberg News is reporting this morning that the use of two different versions of CATIA 3D CAD software—versions that are incompatible at the file level—is largely to blame for significant delays on the Airbus A380 project.

“Airbus Vows Computers Will Speak Same Language After A380 Delay,” says the headline.

Software used to manage the design and manufacture of the 555-seat A380 at Airbus's Hamburg engineering center isn't fully compatible with that used at company headquarters in Toulouse, France, say current and former Airbus executives, including Charles Champion, who headed the A380 program until September. That's why hundreds of small changes to electrical wiring in the A380 snowballed into at least a year’s delay in delivering the world's biggest passenger aircraft and $2.5 billion in lost profit. Airbus Chief Executive Officer Christian Streiff may announce additional costs or longer delays for the A380 in coming days. The board of Airbus parent European Aeronautic, Defence & Space Co. meets today in Amsterdam.

The incompatible software products are CATIA V4 and CATIA V5, 3D CAD software from Dassault Systèmes. It is no secret that these two versions of CATIA are incompatible at the file format level, and it is nothing new for a CAD software company to update a file format in such a way that compatibility between versions breaks down. We know this well in AEC. Autodesk changes AutoCAD’s DWG format with every two or three annual releases. Bentley is still guiding customers through the transition between MicroStation V7 and V8 formats, even though MicroStation V8 first came out in 2001.

It would be easy to blame Dassault for this mess by criticizing their decision to change the file format in CATIA 5. Easy, but wrong. Doing so sends a really dumb message to software vendors: Don’t Innovate. How much productivity and new functionality would be lost from CATIA V5 if Dassault had stuck with the internal file format of the previous version? Quite a bit. Sometimes you just have to jump the chasm.

The real problem looks to be a lack of leadership at the top levels at Airbus. Somebody inside Airbus knew that engineers in Germany and Spain were using CATIA V4 while CATIA V5 was in use in the UK and France. Somebody made a decision not to push for a single compatible standard, or to at least invest in a translator system. As a result, Airbus has already announced earnings losses of $2.54 billion over the next three years, according to Bloomberg. I am sure the Airbus board of directors, meeting today in Amsterdam, would like to know Somebody’s name.

What can CAD users in general learn from this? First and foremost, either commit 100% to the use of your software, or find a different CAD standard that gives you the comfort you seek. Don’t be half-hearted. Aggressively demand the best from your vendor and then aggressively work internally to make your purchase work. Allowing different versions to co-exist in a design environment to avoid personnel issues may be penny-wise, but it is also certainly pound-foolish. Whining about lousy software without a will to invest in a solution is pathetic.

The second lesson is to plan ahead. In the case of Airbus, if an analysis showed there was good reason to continue using two different version of CATIA, there should have been a similar decision—made and implemented in advance—to guide how designs from the two versions would come together. All indications at the moment are that none of this happened. I say this knowing that the design work on the A380 started before the release of CATIA V5. It didn't take a crystal ball to know Dassault's plans for the future of the product line.

The third lesson is to directly address cultural issues regarding the use of design software. Time and time again I have heard engineering managers and CAD directors say the most difficult part of implementing new software is the resistance among the old guard. Why should engineers in Germany and Spain have been allowed to continue using CATIA V4 when engineers in France and the UK were already on CATIA V5? It only makes sense if appeasement is a core corporate value.

I can’t help but think of Foster and Partners in the UK, famed both for its striking designs and its aggressive use of design technology. They work closely with their CAD vendor of choice, Bentley, but it certainly is not a case of Fosters being spoon-fed everything Bentley has to offer. They push Bentley for certain tools, and Bentley wisely listens. Passivity in such a relationship would be deadly for both parties. I can’t imagine that either Lord Norman Foster or Iain Godwin, Foster’s executive in charge of technology, would allow cultural issues to prevent them from implementing new software.

CAD vendors all share a passion to create software that makes its users more productive, more efficient, and—they hope—more creative by removing the drudgery from design and engineering. They get rich only if their customers are successful. The purchase and use of CAD software needs to be clearly understood as a strategic issue; top management in design and engineering firms need to make the tough decisions. If Airbus loses $2.54 billion because senior management allowed disagreement in the user ranks about what CAD software should be in use to sway a business decision, then it deserves its losses

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By Randall S. Newton
Editor-in-Chief